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Comment
THE PROCESS BEHIND SUCCESSFUL TAX REFORM*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress' recent proposal to overhaul the income tax system was a
necessary response to the growing dissatisfaction with the income tax
system. Until a decade ago, the federal income tax system, although not
popular, was at least viewed as fair. However, in recent years, polls have
uniformly shown that the public views the federal income tax as being
the least fair, least popular tax in the country. Ultimately, this change of
attitude can be attributed to the public's growing perception that the
income tax, as it is presently applied, is arbitrary and unfair.' In addi-
tion, the increasing complexity and incoherency of the current Internal
Revenue Code (Code) necessitates tax reform. True tax reform will not
be achieved unless there is significant simplication of code provisions.
This paper will focus on the reasons that tax reform is deemed necessary
and the goals that the legislation is attempting to achieve. The paper
will also consider the two primary tax reform proposals: the Treasury
Department's original proposal, Treasury I, and the Administration's
proposal. Finally, this paper will discuss the House's attempt to recon-
cile these plans in enacting the House bill, H.R. 3838.
* EDITOR'S NOTE: This Comment is based on remarks made by David
Brockway, Chief of Staff, Congressional Joint Taxation Committee. Wayne
Dillahey, Associate Editor, wrote substantial portions of this Comment.
This Comment was written to show the progress of the tax reform
movement as of February 22, 1986, the date of the Villanova Law Review Tax
Reform Symposium. The postscript reflects, briefly, some of the major changes
introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 since that date.
1. See The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Sim-
plicity, 1985: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on President's Proposals] (recent Inter-
nal Revenue Service survey reports that 80% of all taxpayers believe present tax
system is unfair). Public hearings held by the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee also revealed increasing disrespect for, and dissatisfaction with, the federal
income tax system. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1985); see also
PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIM-
PLICITY 1 (May 1985) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS] ("The over-
whelming majority of Americans are dissatisfied with the current tax system.").
Because the federal income tax system is based on voluntary tax compliance, it
was thought that if the public's perception of the fairness of the system contin-
ued to decline, taxpayers would become less willing to pay taxes and the viability
of the tax system would be threatened.
(1803)
1
Editors: The Process Behind Successful Tax Reform
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
1804 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31: p. 1803
II. THE NEED FOR TAX REFORM
A. Closing the Tax Loopholes
As the economy becomes more sophisticated, the tax law necessar-
ily becomes more complex. As the economic structure changes, Con-
gress is faced with the task of enacting comprehensive legislation that
will maximize revenue by ensuring that those who gain the most finan-
cial benefit from such changes bear the tax burden. However, after laws
have "been on the books" for a period of time, taxpayers against whom
the laws are directed devise "loopholes" or plans to get around them.
2
Congress in turn is forced to come up with increasingly complex rules to
close loopholes-the result being a Code that is several volumes thick
and difficult to use.3
2. See TREASURY DEP'T, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND Eco-
NOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 6
(1984) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY I]. In its original tax reform proposal to
the President, the Treasury Department made note of the recent boom in the tax
shelter industry. Id. The Treasury Department stated:
Some shelters involve little more than thinly veiled, if sophisticated, tax
fraud. But even perfectly legal tax shelters distort the allocation of
scarce capital because they produce highly visible inequities in taxation.
Perhaps most importantly of all, they undermine taxpayer confidence in
the integrity and fairness of the tax system. Tax shelter losses typically
result from a combination of current deductions for future expenses,
deferral of taxable income, and conversion of ordinary income to pref-
erentially taxed long-term capital gains. Thus, shelters allow taxpayers
to defer tax liability far into the future. Tax deferral is equivalent to an
interest-free loan from the Federal Government.
Id. at 6-7.
3. For most taxpayers, the income tax was simpler following the enactment
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, in part because incomes were lower and the
financial affairs of most families were simpler. Id. at 3. Most taxpayers did not
need to engage the services of a tax professional to file an individual income tax
return and tax planning was the concern of only a few. Id.
However, as loopholes and inconsistencies in the tax laws have been discov-
ered or created, exploited, and then plugged, techniques of tax avoidance have
become increasingly sophisticated and the complexity of the income tax has
grown, in a never-ending cycle. Id. at 1. The Treasury Department noted that:
Today, the proliferation and expansion of exclusions, adjustments
to income, deductions, and credits create a major burden of paperwork
and make part-time bookkeepers of many Americans. At present,
about 100 different Federal tax forms are used by individuals. Many
decisions-for example, whether and how to make a charitable contri-
bution, whether to participate in insurance plans offered by an em-
ployer, and whether to contribute to a political party-all have tax
consequences. Ordinary citizens are confronted with the alternatives of
using a professional tax preparer, becoming knowledgeable in arcane
tax law, running afoul of the tax administration, or possibly passing up
available tax benefits. Today, over 40 percent of all individual income
tax returns-and some 60 percent of all long forms (form 1040s)-are
prepared by paid professionals. So-called tax shelters, once known
only to the wealthy, are now attracting increasing numbers of middle-
income Americans, many of whom do not have access to sophisticated
tax advice and are misled by the misrepresentations of unscrupulous
2
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Another reason that tax law has become increasingly complex is
that Congress has attempted to accomplish a variety of non-tax policy
goals that have started to produce a muddle of different provisions,
working at cross-purposes. 4 The result is an inefficient system whereby
there is a radically different effective tax rate for different lines of busi-
ness.5 It is as if there is an incoherent, unplanned industrial policy run-
ning through the Code, which is arbitrarily giving some industries a high
effective rate and others a low effective rate. Many analysts have sug-
gested that there would be a more efficient economy if all of the various
business activities were taxed at a more comparable level, rather than at
promoters of illegal shelters, often with disastrous effects. Legislative
response to the tax shelter problem over the last 15 years has involved
a patchwork of solutions that has generally increased the complexity of
the tax systems without correcting the underlying causes of tax shelters.
Id. at 3-4.
In addition to the administrative burden imposed on taxpayers, the Code's
complexity may be responsible for the public's perception that the tax system is
unfair. PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 1. Taxpayers perceive "that
complexity is the means by which some benefit while others do not." Id. Thus,
some taxpayers feel that they have to pay more than their fair share of tax be-
cause complexities in the system give unwarranted benefits to others. See Hear-
ings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of James A. Baker III,
Secretary of Treasury).
4. Many tax incentives, which were individually designed to promote de-
sired objectives such as encouraging investment and increasing productivity,
collectively have caused significant economic distortions and have increased the
tax burden on other sectors of the economy. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at
54. These incentives have often caused the unintended result of diverting capi-
tal from productive investments to less productive, but tax-favored, investments.
Id. For example,
excessive tax incentives have encouraged the construction of office
buildings in communities with already record high office vacancy rates.
Tax incentives designed to aid farmers have shifted the ownership of
farm property from family farmers to investors with higher marginal
rates, since the latter obtain greater benefits from the tax deductions
provided.
Id. Due to such tax incentives, many "investments are made only because they
produce large deductions and credits that may be used to offset other income,
and, importantly, not because there is a market demand for the services pro-
vided by these investments." Id. Such "tax-induced distortions in the use of
labor and capital and in consumer choices have severe costs in terms of lower
productivity, lost production, and reduced consumer satisfaction." TREASURY I,
supra note 2, at 4. Consequently, the federal tax code has become overloaded
with tax incentive provisions "that fail to accomplish the objectives for which
they were originally intended." H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 54.
5. The existing taxation of capital and business income "favors capital-in-
tensive industries over others, such as services." TREASURY I, supra note 2, at 5.
Existing tax laws also favor: "industries that are usually dependent on equip-
ment over those-such as wholesale and retail trade-that rely more heavily on
other forms of capital, including inventories and structures." Id.
Other industries that currently benefit from special tax subsidies or prefer-
ences include banking, insurance, mining, timber and oil and gas. See PRESI-
DENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 6.
1986] 1805
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the radically diverse levels that exist under current law.
6
Another reason that enactment of non-tax policy goals leads to dis-
enchantment, is that the goals are accomplished by reducing the taxes of
those who make a desired investment, thereby defeating the major goal
of the income tax system, which is to insure that those taxpayers who
make the same amount of income pay the same amount of tax. The
result is that Congress is forced, through public pressure, to enact anti-
abuse rules designed to prevent people from decreasing their income
tax by taking advantage of incentives originally in the Code. This phe-
nomenon of creating incentives and then indirectly eliminating them,
further contributes to the incoherency and instability of the Code. Many
experts argue that if Congress enacts a system with the sole goal of rais-
ing revenue, the result will be a more coherent, stable Code.7
B. Unfairness of the Current System
Because the general public feels it is being taken advantage of, it
perceives the current system as unfair. A common complaint of average
taxpayers is that while they are paying a substantial amount of taxes, a
majority of those taxpayers earning a higher income, as well as many
businesses, are paying little or no tax.8 In fact, this is a partial miscon-
ception, because the current system is a progressive one with upper-
income people, on the average, paying a significantly higher tax rate
than middle- and lower-income people.9 Furthermore, corporations,
even though their contributions to federal revenue have decreased over
the last thirty years, 10 still pay a substantial amount of taxes.
A 1983 study of effective corporate tax rates does lend some
6. By not taxing all business activities similarly, the tax system reduces the
efficiency of the economy. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 59. Excessive tax
preferences for certain industries result in too much investment in those indus-
tries and force other industries to shoulder an increased tax burden. Id. If in-
vestments were equally taxed in all business sectors, the tax system would no
longer interfere with the efficient allocation of resources in the economy. Id. at
58. When the market, rather than the tax laws, governs capital allocation, "the
total output obtainable from the economy's stock of capital is maximized." Id. at
59; see also Hearings on Presidents Proposals, supra note 1, at 534 (statement of Alan
Greenspan, President, Townsend-Greenspan & Co.: sounder economy likely to
result as consequence of shift away from tax subsidies).
7. See, e.g., Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 1806 (statement of
K. Martin Worthy, Chairman, American College of Tax Counsel: sole purpose
of Code should be to raise revenue).
8. See TREASURY I supra note 2, at 9; President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 1.
For a further discussion of the public's view of the unfairness of the tax system,
see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9. See I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1986). The present personal income tax law
provides for 14 brackets of tax rates ranging from 11% to 50%. Id.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 55. Between 1955 and 1985, the
percentage of total budget receipts attributable to corporate income taxes de-
clined from 27% to 8%. Id. Over the same period, the corporate income tax as
a percentage of total income tax receipts declined from 38% to 16%. Id. at 56.
4
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credence to the public's view that corporations are not meeting their
share of the tax burden. The study established that eighty of the 200
largest corporations had an effective tax rate of less than 10%, measured
by the amount of tax paid as a percentage of book income reported to
shareholders."I At the present time, the conclusion is inescapable that
there are numerous highly successful businesses paying very little reve-
nue to the federal government. On the individual side, a 1983 study of
United States taxpayers earning over $250,000 revealed that a number
did pay a substantial amount of tax. 12 However, about 11% of those
high-income taxpayers had effective tax rates of less than 5% and more
than half had effective tax rates of less than 20%. 13 Among taxpayers
with the very highest incomes-those with incomes greater than $2 mil-
lion in 1983-63% paid an effective tax rate of less than 20%. 14 In light
of these figures, the general view as to the unfairness of the system
seems justified. This is best typified by noting that most people in the
entry-level bracket have income and social security tax imposed on the
first dollar of their income which results in an effective rate of 14% (the
income tax alone at this level is I 1%). Thus, at the present time, there
are a significant number of taxpayers with income levels below the pov-
erty line paying more taxes than approximately 15% of the richest indi-
viduals in the United States.
Perhaps the primary reason for this disparity in tax payments is the
substantial amount of tax sheltering tolerated by the system thereby al-
lowing high-income taxpayers to avoid the payment of a significant
amount of tax. 15 Tax reform must address the public's concern that
11. See Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 351 (statement of
Robert S. McIntyre, Director of Federal Tax Policy, Citizens for Tax Justice:
median tax rate was 8.7% for large corporations). TheJoint Committee on Tax-
ation and Citizens for Tax Justice conducted studies on the nation's largest cor-
porations which found that the average effective corporate rate has fallen to
between 14% and 16%. Id. In the Citizens for Tax Justice's October 1984 re-
port, it was disclosed that the median tax rate for "250 large, profitable compa-
nies" was only 8.7%. Id. Between 1981 and 1983, more than half of the 250
companies studied enjoyed at least one year in which they either paid no federal
income taxes or received tax refunds. Id. A quarter of the companies paid no
federal income taxes at all over the three-year period, including such giant firms
as General Electric, Boeing, Dow Chemical and Tenneco. Id.
12. Id. at 20 (statement of James A. Baker, III, Secretary of the Treasury).
The Treasury Department studied taxpayers who, ranked by income, repre-
sented approximately the top one-fourth of one percent of all households in the
United States. Id. The study ranked these taxpayers on the basis of their posi-
tive sources of income only, that is, income before deducting any offsetting
losses. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Eleven percent of those taxpayers with incomes in excess of $2 mil-
lion paid an effective tax rate that was less than 5%. Id.
15. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, at 6-9. In its original tax reform poposal
to the President, the Treasury Department illustrated the recent abuses of tax
shelters by citing a sample of 88 taxpayers who held interests in certain tax shel-
ters. Id. at 7. The Treasury Department explained that tax shelter accounting
5
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many taxpayers are making investments that allow them to avoid paying
any current tax to the federal government. In summation, in order to
achieve tax reform which will be acceptable to the general public, Con-
gress must enact a statutory scheme which fairly distributes the tax
burden. 16
C. Who Should Bear the Burden of Tax Reform
In the past, taxpayers have resisted any attempts to "broaden the
tax base" and "lower rates" because they believed that such suggestions
were in actuality simply attempts to change the distribution of the tax
law or raise revenue. Consequently, the tax reform legislation which has
recently been proposed is designed to avoid those issues by being neu-
tral as to revenue raising and tax distribution. 17
Despite the fact that one of the congressional goals to be furthered
by the tax reform legislation is to lower tax rates across the board, some
individual's and corporation's taxes are necessarily going to increase. 18
losses and other business and investment-related losses are used to offset gross
income and, thereby, reduce the taxpayer's income tax liability. Id. at 9. The
Treasury Department study concluded:
Of the 88 returns sampled, 19 returns, with an average gross in-
come before loss (positive income) of $243,710, reported a total in-
come tax payment of $500 or less; 37 returns, with an average gross
income before loss of $172,113 reported a total tax payment of $6,000
or less. By comparison, a typical family of four, with positive income of
$45,000, but no tax shelter losses, would pay $6,272 in taxes. The ex-
tent to which tax shelter losses can be used to dramatically reduce tax
liabilities is further documented by estimates from the 1983 Treasury
tax model which show that 9,000 taxpayers with gross incomes before
losses of $250,000 or more paid no tax as a direct result of partnership
losses, while 59,000 taxpayers with that much positive income were
able to reduce their tax payments by at least one-half.
Id.
16. In fact, it was because of massive tax distribution problems that the
Treasury Department, in its original tax reform proposal, recommended not
adopting a flat tax. Id. at 21-23. The Treasury Department noted that some of
the advantages of a pure flat tax, as compared to the present graduated system
of tax rates, included the loss of taxpayers incentive to shift and defer income to
take advantage of lower rates. Id. at 21. However, the Treasury Department
concluded that, despite these important advantages, the redistribution of the tax
burden from high-income taxpayers to low or middle-income taxpayers was un-
acceptable. Id. Thus, the Treasury Department recommended against the en-
actment of a pure flat tax. Id. at 23.
17. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 62, 84-85. It is estimated that the
bill passed by the House of Representatives, H.R. 3838, will raise 99.9% of the
revenue which would have been raised under current law over the five-year pe-
riod from 1986 to 1990. Id. at 62. In addition to being revenue neutral, H.R.
3838 attempts to distribute individual tax reductions equitably among the vast
majority of individuals who bear the tax burden, thereby avoiding tax redistribu-
tion problems. Id. at 84.
18. The total amount of tax revenue generated is basically a function of two
variables, the tax rate and the tax base. If the tax reform legislation is to be
revenue neutral as planned, the proposed reductions in tax rates must be offset
1808 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1803
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It is primarily those taxpayers who are not benefitting from substantial
preferences under the current law who will have their aggregate tax rate
reduced.19 Perhaps the entities which will be most adversely affected by
the recent tax reform proposals will be corporate taxpayers. 20 As can be
expected, corporate lobbyists are actively resisting the recent tax reform
proposals. It is not surprising that the taxpayers who may lose substan-
tial preferences under the various tax reform proposals are lobbying
much more actively than those members of the general public who will
benefit from tax reform.
II. THE POLITICAL PROCESS BEHIND ENACTING
COMPREHENSIVE TAx REFORM
A. The Treasury Department's Proposal and the Administration's Proposal
Despite the opposition from a strong corporate lobby, there will be
tax reform, primarily because of the leadership of President Reagan,
who strongly supports significant tax reform. In 1984, President Reagan
directed the Treasury to design a comprehensive tax reform package. 2 1
by a corresponding increase in the tax base. The proposed legislation broadens
the tax base by eliminating inefficient and preferential tax provisions and cur-
tailing abuses. Id. at 57. Consequently, individual taxpayers and corporations
which formerly benefitted from these preferential tax laws may be faced with
increased tax liability despite the rate reductions.
19. For example, under the Administration's proposal, 79% of all families
and individuals would have their taxes reduced or would experience no change
in their income tax liability. See Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 27
(statement of James A. Baker, III, Secretary of the Treasury). The 21% who
would face increased tax bills, are those currently enjoying special tax law bene-
fits or concessions which are not being enjoyed by the majority. Id. This 21%
would see their tax bills rise by an average of 17%. Id.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 55-56. Between 1950 and 1985,
the income tax paid by corporations as a percentage of total income tax receipts
declined from 40% to only 16%. Id. at 55. For a discussion of the reduction of
the proportion of income taxes paid by corporations, see supra note 10 and ac-
companying text. The tax reform bill passed by the House, H.R. 3838, will
greatly restrict the ability of corporations to eliminate their tax liability in an
attempt to restore the traditional balance of income tax between individuals and
corporations. Id. The House bill will increase the share of total taxes paid by
corporations an estimated 2.9% over the next five years. Id. at 56. The House
explained that "[w]hile this increase is significant relative to the present law pro-
jections, the estimated share of taxes paid by corporations is still modest in com-
parison to historical levels." Id.
21. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, at iii. President Reagan directed the
Treasury to undertake this study in his State of the Union address in January,
1984. Id. In this address, the President stated:
To talk of meeting the present situation by increasing taxes is a Band-
Aid solution which does nothing to cure an illness that has been coming
on for halfa century, to say nothing of the fact that it poses a real threat
to economic recovery ....
There is a better way: Let us go forward with an historic reform for
fairness, simplicity and incentives for growth. I am asking Secretary
Don Regan for a plan for action to simplify the entire tax code so all
19861 1809
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The result, Treasury 1,22 was politically neutral and, from a tax expert's
standpoint, an accurate measurement of income. 23 The Reagan Admin-
istration made a number of changes to Treasury I in order to have this
proposal comply with its policy goals. These changes solved certain
political problems which were inherent in Treasury 1.24 Nevertheless, the
tax reform package that the Administration sent to Congress was an ex-
tremely controversial piece of legislation.
Generally, the House supported the notion of broadening the tax
base. 25 There were a number of representatives who felt this issue to be
so important that they would not support a tax reform package which
did not accomplish significant base broadening. In fact, one of the ma-
jor difficulties in achieving tax reform legislation has been this refusal by
individual members of the House to support an overall package that
does not include the various elements that each feels is important to
achieve comprehensive tax reform. This may be illustrated by examin-
ing the response to Treasury I's proposal to eliminate the deduction for
payment of state and local taxes.2 6 Although a simple majority of the
taxpayers, big and small, are treated more fairly .... I have asked that
specific recommendations, consistent with those objectives, be
presented to me by December 1984.
Id.
22. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, Vols. 1, 2 and 3.
23. See Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 2403-58 (statements
of Harvey Galper, Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution; Hugh Calkins, Esq.,
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio; Paul McDaniel, Professor of Law,
Boston College School of Law; Marshall E. Blume, Professor of Finance, the
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; and Isabel Sawhill, Senior Fellow,
the Urban Institute). The Treasury Department's proposal noted that in order
to insure a fair and neutral tax code, all income had to be subject to taxation,
regardless of its source or use. TREASURY I, supra note 2, at 73. Therefore,
Treasury I sought to broaden the tax base by: 1) subjecting presently excluded
sources of income to taxation and 2) eliminating deductions for certain pre-
ferred uses of income. Id. at 73-84. In the former category, Treasury I proposed
changes to existing law in the areas of employee fringe benefits, retirement sav-
ings, wage replacements, scholarships and fellowships and treatment of capital
gains. Id. at 73-77. In the latter category, Treasury I proposed eliminating some
deductions for state and local taxes, charitable contributions and interest ex-
penses. Id. at 78-83. For a further discussion of Treasury I's proposal to elimi-
nate the deduction for payment of state and local taxes, see infra notes 26-27 &
30 and accompanying text.
24. See generally McLure, Where Tax Reform Went Astray, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1619
(1986); TREASURY I, supra note 2.
25. See Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Dan
Rostenkowski, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Rep.:
House must broaden tax base by reducing or eliminating preferences which pro-
tect income from taxation).
26. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, at 78. Treasury I justified the proposed
elimination of the state and local tax deduction on a number of grounds. Id.
First, the Treasury explained that the historical justification for the deduction
was no longer relevant. Id. Many years ago, when top federal income tax rates
neared 90%, the deduction was necessary to "prevent the sum of the marginal
tax rates for federal and state income taxes from exceeding 100 percent." Id.
8
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House Ways and Means Committee would have supported imposing a
limitation on the deduction for state and local taxes, a working majority
could not be achieved because four of five members of the committee
would not support a bill including this change. Thankfully, in the end,
concessions were made as members focused their attention on enacting
a bill that the public would perceive as reflecting its objectives rather
than one that would reflect the objectives of a committee composed of
tax experts. 27
B. Comparison of the Administration's Proposal and H.R. 3838
The basic features of the Administration's proposal and H.R. 3838
are the same. The substantial rate reductions, both on the corporate
and individual side, particularly in the upper rate bracket, are present in
both H.R. 3838 and the Administration's proposal. 28 Furthermore, each
version funds the rate reductions by broadening the tax base. In the
aggregate, H.R. 3838 probably broadens the base slightly more than the
Administration's proposal. Profiles of the "winners" and "losers" are
substantially the same as each proposes to shift the tax burden from the
individual to the corporate sector.
29
The greatest difference between the Administration's proposal and
H.R. 3838 is that the former would repeal the deduction given for state
The Treasury concluded that given the present levels of tax rates, such a possi-
bility did not exist and, therefore, the deduction was no longer needed. Id.
In addition, the Treasury explained that because the deduction for state and
local taxes leads to higher federal tax rates for everyone, there is a net benefit
only for those states that levy above-average taxes. Id. at 80. Residents of states
with below-average taxes are worse off than if there was no deduction. Id.
Therefore, the Treasury noted that these low-tax states were indirectly subsi-
dizing the high-tax states. Id. at 81.
27. The House passed H.R. 3838 which retains the full deduction for pay-
ment of state and local taxes. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 60.
28. Compare H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101, 301 (1985) with PRESI-
DENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 3, 118. The Administration proposed that
the current 14 tax rates should be replaced by three rates-15%, 25% and
35%-and that the applicable tax rate brackets should be indexed to adjust for
inflation as under existing law. PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 3. The
House Bill, H.R. 3838, provides for four marginal tax rates, 15%, 25%, 35%
and 38%. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1985). The Administration
would reduce the maximum rate for corporations from 46% to 33%. PRESI-
DENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 118-19. H.R. 3838 decreases the maximum
corporate rate to 36%. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1985).
29. See PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 461; H.R. REP. No. 426,
supra note 1, at 56. The President's proposal would increase the yearly income
tax liability of corporations by approximately $20 billion over current law while
the income tax liability of individuals would decrease approximately $25 billion.
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 461. H.R. 3838 calls for the share of
total taxes paid by corporations to increase from 15.6% in 1985 to 22.3% in
1990. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 56. For a discussion of how the share
of the corporate income tax as a percentage of total income tax receipts has
declined over the last 30 years, see supra note 10.
9
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and local taxes. By eliminating this deduction, the Administration's pro-
posal would raise approximately $150 billion in revenue during a five-
year period.30 However, H.R. 3838 retained the deduction.3 1 Theoreti-
30. See PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 62-64, 453. Under current
law, individuals who itemize deductions are permitted to deduct state and local
property taxes, income taxes and general sales taxes without regard to whether
they were incurred in carrying on a trade or business or an income-producing
activity. Id. at 62. Other state and local taxes are deductible by individuals only
if they are incurred in carrying on a trade or business or income-producing activ-
ity. Id. The President's Proposals noted that this deduction has created one of
the most serious omissions from the federal income tax base and claimed that
unless this omission is corrected, a substantial reduction in marginal rates will
not be possible. Id. at 63. Consequently, the Administration proposes the re-
peal of the itemized deduction for state and local income taxes and for other
state and local taxes which are not incurred in the carrying on of a trade or
business or income-producing activity. Id. at 64. State and local taxes (other
than income taxes) which currently are deductible only by itemizers, but which
were incurred in carrying on an income-producing activity, will be aggregated
with employee business expenses and will be deductible subject to a threshold.
See id. at 104-05.
31. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 60. The House Committee on
Ways and Means noted that the proposal to eliminate the deduction for state
and local taxes stimulated more broadbased concern than any other provision of
the President's package. See Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 5449.
In recognition of this, the Committee scheduled a full-day's hearing on the im-
pact of the President's proposal on state and local governments. See id. at 5449-
888.
The majority of speakers at the hearing strongly opposed eliminating the
deduction for a variety of reasons. See id. at 5450 (statement of Jacob K. Javits,
former Senator from New York: eliminating deductions runs counter to reality,
to U.S. Federal system, to comity between states and to equal treatment of their
citizens): id. at 5455 (statement of Howard Wolpe, member of Congress from
Michigan: proposed elimination of deduction would violate reciprocal immunity
whereby states do not tax federal property and federal government does not tax
state and local activities); id. at 5479 (statement of Bill Green, member of Con-
gress from New York: deduction does not subsidize high tax states because such
states assume greater social responsibility than other states); id. at 5485 (state-
ment of John Carlin, Governor, State of Kansas: state and local tax deduction
contributing disproportionate share of base broadening compared to other de-
ductions); id. at 5502 (statement of Mario M. Cuomo, Governor, State of New
York: deduction must be retained because it is part of overall subsidy structure
built into Code and because it helps states meet their needs); id. at 5609 (state-
ment of Andrew P. O'Rourke, County Executive, Westchester County, New
York: deductibility of taxes preserves ability of state and local governments to
raise revenues and provide services, promotes equity in federal tax system,
avoids excessive cumulative tax rates and helps preserve independence of state
and local governments); id. at 5597 (statement of Don Bailey, Auditor General,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: elimination of deduction would have devastat-
ing impact upon both state and local governments); id. at 5600 (statement of
Patrick G. Halpin, Assemblyman, Lindenhurst, New York: eliminating deduc-
tion of local taxes would reduce local government investment in public educa-
tion); id. at 5603 (statement of John Bragg, Deputy Speaker, Legislature of
Tennessee, President, National Conference of State Legislatures: deduction
should be retained to avoid increasing financial pressure on state and local gov-
ernments, to maintain balance in the federal system of government, to avoid
skewing priorities, to avoid greater tax competition and to avoid double taxa-
10
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cally, the deduction may not be justifiable from a tax policy stand-
point,3 2 but as a political matter, it was simply not realistic for the
tion); id. at 5614 (statement of Al Bilik, Executive Director, State and Local Divi-
sion, Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO: elimination of deduction would
impose a tax on a tax); id. at 5874 (statement of Senator Horn, President, Cali-
fornia State University at Long Beach, on Behalf of the American Association of
State Colleges and Universities: elimination of deduction would have negative
impact on state higher education spending and is bad public policy).
32. The deduction for payment of state and local taxes is often defended on
the grounds that income used to pay taxes to other levels of government should
not be counted in determining an individual's ability to pay taxes at the federal
level. Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 5617 (statement of Al Bilik,
Executive Director, State and Local Division, Public Employee Department,
AFL-CIO). To subject the income used to make state and local tax payments to
a federal tax amounts to double taxation which is fundamentally unfair. See id. at
5606 (statement of John Bragg, President, National Conference of State
Legislatures).
However, in recommending that the deduction be eliminated, the Presi-
dent's proposal dismissed this rationale as fallacious. PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS,
supra note 1, at 63-64. In reaching this conclusion, the President's proposal
explained:
Some argue that the deductibility of State and local taxes is appro-
priate because individuals should not be "taxed on a tax." The argu-
ment is deficient for a number of reasons. First, it ignores the effect of
State and local tax deductibility on the Federal income tax base. De-
ductibility not only reduces aggregate Federal income tax revenues, it
shifts the burden of collecting those revenues from high-tax to low-tax
States. High-tax States effectively shield a disproportionate share of
their income from Federal taxation, leaving a relatively greater share of
revenues to be collected from low-tax States. Absent the ability to im-
pose Federal income tax on amounts paid in State and local taxes, the
Federal government loses the ability to control its own tax base and to
insist that the burden of Federal income taxes be distributed evenly
among the States.
Second, the "tax on a tax" argument suggests that amounts paid in
State or local taxes should be exempt from Federal taxation because
they are involuntary and State or local taxpayers receive nothing in re-
turn for their payments. Neither suggestion is correct. State and local
taxpayers have ultimate control over the taxes they pay through the
electoral process and through their ability to locate in jurisdictions with
amenable tax and fiscal policies. Moreover, State and local taxpayers
receive important personal benefits in return for their taxes, such as
public education, water and sewer services, and municipal garbage re-
moval. In this respect, the determination by State and local taxpayers
of their levels of taxation and public service benefits is analogous to
their individual decisions over how much to spend for the purchase of
private goods.
It is, of course, true that not all benefits provided by State and local
governments are directly analogous to privately purchased goods or
services. Examples include police and fire protection, judicial and ad-
ministrative services and public welfare. These services nevertheless
provide substantial personal benefits to State and local taxpayers,
whether directly or by enhancing the general quality of life in State and
local communities.
Finally, the "tax on a tax" argument is contradicted by the practice
of most States with respect to their own tax systems, including many of
11
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Administration to expect Congress to repeal this deduction. As far as
H.R. 3838 was concerned, it was not even a regional issue-there was
not much support from any area of the country to repeal this deduc-
tion.33 Retaining this deduction was an example of Congress' attempt
to meet the public's objectives: the general public does not believe that
the deduction it receives for paying taxes is the abuse in the system
which causes basic unfairness. Rather, the general perception is that
payment of taxes is a cost that should justifiably result in a deduction.3 4
By not eliminating the deduction for state and local taxes, the larg-
est revenue raising aspect of the Administration's proposal, H.R. 3838
necessarily had to contain fewer rate cuts than the Administration's pro-
those with high tax rates. Federal income taxes are allowable as a de-
duction from State individual income taxes in only 16 States and from
State corporate income taxes in only seven States. New York and Cali-
fornia, States with very high tax rates, are among the States that deny a
deduction for Federal income taxes.
Id.
In addition, the President's proposal supported its recommendation to
eliminate the deduction by noting that the deduction disproportionately benefits
high-income taxpayers residing in high-tax states. Id. at 62. The Treasury De-
partment, in its tax reform proposal to the President, set forth a similar argu-
ment to support its recommendation to repeal the deduction. See TREASURY I,
supra note 2, at 78-81. For a discussion of the Treasury Department's argument
in support of its recommendation to eliminate the deduction for state and local
taxes, see supra note 26. However, advocates of the deduction dispute this argu-
ment as well. See Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 5606 (statement
ofJohn Bragg, President, National Conference of State Legislatures). These ad-
vocates argue that the deduction is of genuine benefit to the middle class, not
merely to high-income taxpayers. Id. As for "high tax states," they argue that
the deduction is only one of many federal provisions which does not treat states
even-handedly. Id.
33. But see Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 5508 (statement of
Richard L. Thornburgh, Governor, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania). In calling
for the repeal of the deduction, Governor Thornburgh claimed that the two-
thirds of Americans who do not itemize get no benefit from the deduction, and
end up subsidizing those who do. Id. at 5509. The Governor stated that the
average citizen in the thirty-four lower-tax states ends up subsidizing high-in-
come taxpayers in higher-tax states. Id. Governor Thornburgh concluded that
"the choice is simple: either to continue a tax break which benefits only one-
third of all taxpayers, and those in the high brackets in high tax States at that, or
to provide lower tax rates for all taxpayers in all States, as the President has
proposed." Id.
34. See id. at 5622 (statement of Al Bilik, Executive Director, State and Local
Division, Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO). An April 1985 Roper Poll
found that more than 80% of the people it surveyed termed the deductions for
homeowner's property taxes (87%), state and local income taxes (83%) and
state and local sales taxes (82%) "reasonable deductions." Id. The single most
publicized concern of the public in the area of tax reform is the "synthetic de-
ductions and credits which are unavailable to the average taxpayer." Id. at 5884
(statement ofJonathan T. Howe, Second Vice President, National School Board
Association). Thus, singling out and eliminating the deduction for state and lo-
cal taxes was viewed as unresponsive to the public's demand for tax simplifica-
tion and reform. See id.
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posal. The result is that taxpayers in the middle-rate brackets, which
apply to lower-middle income taxpayers, will not realize any substantial
rate cuts. 35 Tax cuts in H.R. 3838 come primarily through increases in
the standard deduction and the personal exemption.3 6 The effect is to
increase the tax entry point above the poverty line and cut taxes for indi-
viduals across the board.3 7
One other significant difference between the Administration's pro-
35. The House bill reduces the Administration's proposed rate cuts by re-
aligning the taxable income brackets and by imposing an increased marginal tax
rate for high-income taxpayers. For example, the taxable income brackets for a
married couple filing jointly under the Administration's proposal and under
H.R. 3838 are illustrated by the following table:
Marginal Taxable Income ($)
Tax Rate President's
(percent) Proposal H.R. 3838
15 4,000 to 29,000 0 - 22,500
25 29,000 to 70,000 22,500 - 43,000
35 70,000 or more 43,000 - 100,000
38 N/A 100,000 or more
See PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at
90.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 90-91. H.R. 3838 called for re-
instituting the standard deduction in place of the current zero bracket amount
(ZBA). Id. at 87. The House explained that:
many individuals find the ZBA to be confusing and do not view it as a
device that simplifies calculation of income tax liability. Under the
committee bill, taxpayers will deduct certain expenses (the standard de-
duction or a total of separately itemized amounts) in order to deter-
mine taxable income. Unlike the ZBA, the standard deduction enables
the taxpayer to know directly how much income is subject to tax and to
understand more clearly that taxable income is the base for determin-
ing tax liability.
Id. at 88. The bill calls for the standard deduction to increase from $3,540 to
$4,800 for joint returns, from $2,390 to $4,200 for heads of households and
from $2,390 to $2,950 for single taxpayers. Id. at 91. In addition to these in-
creases, the standard deduction will be increased an additional $600 for each
taxpayer who is age 65 or older, or who is blind. Id.
In addition, H.R. 3838 calls for an increase in the personal exemption
amount to $2,000. Id. Indexing of this amount to adjust for inflation will con-
tinue, beginning in 1987. Id. The additional exemption under present law for
the elderly and for the blind will be repealed because such taxpayers will be
entitled to a larger standard deduction. Id.
37. Id. at 82. An overriding goal of the House bill is to relieve millions of
poverty-level individuals from federal income tax liability. Id. Accordingly, H.R.
3838 increases the amounts of both the personal exemption and the standard
deduction, as well as the earned income credit, thereby, raising the income level
at which individuals begin to have tax liability (tax threshold). Id. The commit-
tee estimates that as a result of these changes, 6.5 million poverty-level taxpay-
ers will be relieved from the tax roles. Id. In addition, the benefit of these
increases will not be confined to the poor because they will reduce the tax bur-
den for all families by raising the tax threshold for everyone. Id. at 83.
1986] COMMENT 1815
13
Editors: The Process Behind Successful Tax Reform
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
1816 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31: p. 1803
posal and H.R. 3838 is that the distribution of tax cuts in H.R. 3838 is
substantially more even-handed. There is a reasonably uniform consen-
sus among the members of the Administration that the distribution
scheme in the Administration's bill was inequitable.3 8 H.R. 3838, on the
other hand proposes to redistribute the tax cuts in what is perceived to
be a much fairer manner.3
9
On the corporate side, H.R. 3838 proposes to increase corporate
tax rates over the Administration's proposal, while maintaining other
38. One of the most common criticisms of the distribution scheme in the
Administration's proposal is that the proposal grants its largest tax reductions to
the wealthiest Americans, while the burden distributed among the broad mid-
dle-income bracket remains largely unchanged. See Hearings on President's Propos-
als, supra note 1, at 355 (statement of Robert S. McIntyre, Director of Federal
Tax Policy, Citizens for Tax Justice); id. at 558 (statement of Richard A. Mus-
grave, Professor of Economics, Harvard University and University of California,
Santa Cruz). Critics argue that under the Administration's plan, the average in-
dividual earning more than $200,000 will save $10,000 a year in taxes. Id. at
355. This proposed distribution of the tax cuts is particularly troubling to critics
of the Administration's plan:
The rich already got their share and more of tax reduction as a
result of the President's 1981 tax legislation. Individuals earning more
than $200,000 received an average of $30,000 a year or more in tax
reductions from the 1981 rate reductions and expanded tax avoidance
devices. There is nothing even-handed about giving the rich additional
large tax cuts, while short-changing the middle class and, for the poor,
merely rolling back the tax increases that occurred during the Presi-
dent's first term.
Id.
39. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 84. Under the House bill, indi-
viduals with less than $75,000 of income (95% of all income tax filers) will re-
ceive 72% of the total tax reduction for individuals. Id. at 85. Taxpayers with
incomes above $75,000 will receive the remaining 28% of the total tax reduc-
tion. Id. The percentage change in income tax liability and after tax income for
each income class due to H.R. 3838 for 1987 is illustrated by the following table:
Percentage
Percentage change in social
change in security and Percentage
Income class (thousands income tax income tax change in after-
of 1986 dollars) liability liability tax income
Less than $10 ......... .- 76.0 -18.5 1.0
10-20 ................ -23.4 -12.8 1.5
20-30 ................ . - 9.9 - 6.1 1.0
30-40 ................ - 9.0 - 5.7 1.0
40-50 ................ - 8.7 - 5.8 1.2
50-75 ................ - 7.4 - 5.4 1.2
75-100 ............... - 5.7 - 4.7 1.2
100-200 .............. - 7.3 - 6.5 1.9
200 and above ........ - 5.9 - 5.7 1.9
Total - 9.0 - 6.6 1.3
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preferences which have historically favored corporations.4 0 With regard
to specific industries, H.R. 3838 and the Administration's proposal as-
sign the brunt of the tax increase to capital intensive industries, banking
and insurance. 4 1 Over the first five years, the aggregate revenues from
corporations under H.R. 3838 are similar to those suggested in the Ad-
ministration's proposal. 4
2
Despite the aforementioned similarities with the Administration's
bill, H.R. 3838 actually contains significant differences. Perhaps the
most important difference between the two is that the Administration's
proposal did not include any transition rules. 4 3 H.R. 3838, on the other
40. See id. at 232. The following chart offers a comparison of the corporate
tax rates proposed in the Administration's plan and under H.R. 3838.
Corporate Tax Rates
Administration's Proposal H.R. 3838
Taxable Income Tax Rate% Taxable Income Tax Rate %
Not over $25,000 15 Not over $50,000 15
25,000 - 50,000 18 50,000 - 75,000 25
50,000 - 75,000 25 Over 75,000 36
Over 75,000 33
See id.; PREsIDENT's PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 119. Both proposals called for
the phase out of the benefit of graduated rates for corporations which earn
above a certain taxable income. The Administration's proposal calls for the im-
osition of a flat tax of 33% for a corporation with taxable income over
360,000 while H.R. 3838 provides for a flat tax of 3% for a corporation with
taxable income in excess of $365,000. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at
233; PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 119.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 55-56. The committee explained
that many tax provisions that have been used by these industries to substantially
reduce their tax liabilities will be eliminated or restricted by the bill. Id. For
example, the committee noted that defense contractors and large construction
firms will no longer be permitted to defer income to the future while they take
current deductions for expenses. Id. Under the bill, large commercial banks
would no longer be allowed to take deductions for bad debts before the underly-
ing loan is determined to be wholly or partially worthless. Id. Finally, the com-
mittee noted that the insurance industry will also be subject to greater income
tax due to rules designed to more accurately measure income. Id. at 56. For a
discussion of other industries which currently benefit from preferential tax pro-
visions, see supra note 5.
42. Compare H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 65 with PRESIDErr'S PROPOS-
ALS, supra note 1, at 461. The projected corporate tax revenue under the House
bill for the years 1986 to 1990, respectively, will be (in billions of dollars) 15.6,
22.9, 27.1, 32.0 and 41.2. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 65. In compari-
son, the President's proposal will generate corporate revenues of (in billions of
dollars) 18.9, 26.1, 24.3, 23.9 and 25.2. PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at
461.
43. See PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 435. The President's pro-
posal invited the congressional tax writing committees to design appropriate
transition rules to minimize the unfairness and disruption which would result if
the changes were immediately implemented. Id.
15
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hand, introduces approximately $25 billion worth of transition rules.4 4
Another difference is that the Administration's proposal introduced a
windfall recapture tax, which increased the tax for accelerated deprecia-
tion claimed on property put in service before the legislation goes into
effect. 45 Although this proposal would have generated about $55 bil-
lion,4 6 there was never really support in any stage of the political pro-
cess for adopting such a change. A tax reform plan which contains a
windfall tax and which did not provide any transition rules had no
chance of making it through Congress intact.
Following the correction of these shortcomings, the Administration
sent the revised version of its proposal to Congress. However, this re-
vised version was essentially $75 billion short of its goal to remain reve-
nue-neutral. Consistent with the goal to enact legislation that the
general public would perceive as fair, Congress necessarily has to raise
this revenue by increasing the taxes paid by the business sector. Obvi-
ously, this means that the House bill is much less attractive to corporate
taxpayers than the Administration's version.
Despite the differences between the two bills, the Administration
44. See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 151, 203, 252, 335, 616, 677,
703, 11161, 1176, 1223 (1985).
45. See PREsiDENr's PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 193. The President's pro-
posal noted that the substantial rate reductions in the plan made recapture of
accelerated depreciation deductions appropriate. Id. In explaining the need for
the windfall recapture tax, the proposal noted that:
[m]ost taxpayers with substantial accelerated cost recovery deductions
taken over the period 1980-85 will have been able to reduce tax at rates
of 46 or 50 percent (48 or 70 percent for 1980-81). These taxpayers
generally expected to repay their deferred tax liabilities attributable to
accelerated depreciation at the currently applicable 46 to 50 percent
rate. However, because of the proposed reduction in tax rates after
July 1, 1986, the deferred tax liabilities of such taxpayers would gener-
ally be repaid at a 33-percent rate instead of a 46-percent rate for cor-
porations (at a 35-percent rate instead of a 50-percent rate for top-
bracket individuals). In the absence of a rule designed to recapture the
unexpected benefit of the reduction in rates, part of the deferred tax
liabilities attributable to accelerated depreciation deductions would ef-
fectively be forgiven. Taxpayers with deferred tax liabilities on July 1,
1986, would obtain an unintended windfall benefit, which had not been
anticipated when investment decisions were made.
Id.
In order to prevent taxpayers from obtaining such a windfall benefit, the
proposal provided for 40% of a taxpayer's "excess depreciation" taken between
January 1, 1980, and July 1, 1986, to be included in income over a three year
period. Id. "Excess depreciation" was defined as the "excess of cumulative de-
preciation or amortization deductions over [the] cumulative depreciation deduc-
tions that would have been allowed during such period using the straight-line
method" specified under current law at section 312(k) of the Code. Id. For cal-
endar year taxpayers, 12% of the excess depreciation would be included in in-
come for the 1986 taxable year, 12% in 1987, and 16% in 1988. Id.
46. See id. at 455. The President's proposal estimated that the windfall re-
capture tax would yield $7.6 billion in 1986, $19.7 billion in 1987, $20.7 billion
in 1988, and $9.6 billion in 1989. Id.
1818 [Vol. 31: p. 1803
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has taken the position that it will generally support H.R. 3838 if, prior to
final enactment, three basic changes are made. First, the Administration
favors a lowering of the effective tax rate paid by upper income taxpay-
ers from 38% to the Administration's original proposal of 35% .47 Since
the Administration favors maintaining the existing capital gains rate, the
loss of revenue resulting from lowering the highest effective tax rate
from 38% to 35% will have to be replaced by broadening the tax base
by approximately $25 billion dollars. If this change is to occur, it will
have to be done in the Senate, because the House has gone as far as it is
willing to go in terms of base broadening. At this time, it is unclear
whether the Senate can go into areas not touched by H.R. 3838 to raise
the $25 billion. An even more difficult problem to solve than the aggre-
gate dollar amount is what to do about the fact that the change will favor
upper-income taxpayers-those with earnings above $100,000, and par-
ticularly for those with earnings over $200,000.48 It is very difficult to
find any type of base broadening which will raise taxes in higher-income
classes; 4 9 and if the revenue does not come from these classes, then the
result will be a much larger tax cut for upper-income people. The gen-
eral public will view such a result as unfair. In order to enact legislation
with a 35% top rate which the general public will perceive as being equi-
table, Congress will have to increase the tax cut realized by middle- and
lower-income taxpayers. To do this, Congress will have to dramatically
increase the taxes paid by corporations, thereby further widening the
shift of tax liability from individuals to the corporate sector. Consider-
ing the strength of the corporate lobby, this will be difficult to achieve.
Second, the Administration favors a $2,000 personal exemption
across the board, which means that Congress will have to find a way to
raise an additional $40 billion in revenue. Again, this change will give
the greatest benefit to the middle- and upper-income taxpayers. 50 Since
47. See id. at 1.
48. See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1985). Under the House
bill, the top 38% marginal tax rate becomes effective at taxable incomes of
$100,000 for a married couple filing jointly, $60,000 for an unmarried taxpayer,
$75,000 for the head of a household, and $50,000 for a married taxpayer filing
separately. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 90. For a comparison of the
taxable income brackets under the Administration's proposal and the House bill,
see supra note 35.
49. It has been suggested that eliminating the 60% deduction for net capi-
tal gains is one method of broadening the tax base of high-income taxpayers.
Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 510 (statement of Fred Wert-
heimer, President of Common Cause). This is because the capital gains tax pref-
erence primarily benefits such taxpayers. For example, IRS data indicates that
nearly 70% of the capital gains from sales of corporate stock is attributable to
taxpayers with incomes over $100,000. Id. There fore, by eliminating the deduc-
tion, the taxable income of such taxpayers is increased. The original Treasury
proposal called for the repeal of the capital gains deduction, however, neither
the Administration's proposal nor the House bill adopted this reform.
50. See id. at 544 (statement of Martin Feldstein, Professor of Economics,
Harvard University: proposed increase in personal exemption from $1,080 to
19861 COMMENT 1819
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H.R. 3838 proposes to give the full $2,000 exemption to all non-
itemizers, Congress must face the major problem of raising revenue to
pay for this exemption.
5 1
Third, and most important to the Administration, the House bill
presents a major fundamental policy shift on the issue of the cost of
capital. The House bill provides for the repeal of the regular investment
tax credit (ITC), replacement of the existing Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS) with a new "Incentive Depreciation System" and index-
ing to increase depreciation deductions to reflect inflation. 52 The
Treasury has strongly advocated the indexing of depreciation as a way of
lowering the effective rate of tax on capital investment. 53 The problem
$2,000 would cause $40 billion annual revenue loss and would disproportion-
ately benefit higher-income groups). The increase in the personal exemption,
although accomplishing the commendable purpose of removing many low-in-
come families from the tax rolls, would be of primary benefit to higher-income
taxpayers. Id. This would occur because the value of the additional exemption
increases with the taxpayer's marginal rate. Id. About 38% of the $40 billion
tax cut due to the increase in the personal exemption would go to taxpayers with
incomes over $40,000. Id.
51. Some economic experts have argued that the bill could provide the de-
sired assistance to low-income taxpayers without the tremendous loss of revenue
by targeting the tax relief. See id. at 544 (statement of Martin Feldstein, Profes-
sor of Economics, Harvard University); id. at 552 (statement of HenryJ. Aaron,
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution). Martin Feldstein has suggested that per-
haps the simplest method of targeting the tax relief to low-income families is to
increase the personal exemption to $2,000 only for taxpayers in the 15% tax
bracket-that is, for couples and families with taxable income up to $29,000. Id.
at 544. Those in the 25% tax bracket-with incomes between $29,000 and
$70,000-could be given a more modest increase to $1,200. Id. But those with
incomes over $70,000 would continue to receive the $1,080 exemption provided
under current law. Id.
Targeting the increased exemption in this way would cut the revenue cost in
half-to $20 billion a year instead of the $40 billion implied by the President's
proposal. Id. According to Feldstein, "the targeted exemption increase would
nevertheless provide as much relief to low income families and individuals and
could take as many people off the tax rolls as the President's plan." Id.
52. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 147-60. The Incentive Deprecia-
tion System (IDS) groups assets into ten different cost-recovery classes accord-
ing to present class lives, in contrast to the six classes prescribed under the
existing ACRS system. Id. Recovery deductions are determined through pre-
scribed depreciation methods. Id. The cost of most personal property is recov-
erable using the double declining balance method over periods ranging from 3
to 30 years. Id. at 150-52. The cost of real property generally is recoverable
using the straight-line method over 30 years. Id. at 152.
Under current law, the basis of depreciable property is not adjusted for in-
flation. Id. at 154. Under the House bill, beginning in 1988, IDS deductions are
to be increased half the annual inflation rate in excess of 5% after the second
year an asset is placed in service. Id. at 154-55.
53. See TREASURY I, supra note 2, at 105-09. The Treasury noted that the
existing capital cost recovery provisions do not adjust the basis of depreciable
assets for inflation. Id. at 105. Therefore, in order to prevent the confiscatory
taxation of income from capital which inflation causes, the ITC and the ACRS
were introduced, thereby allowing businesses to front-load their cost-recovery
1820
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with that view is that the business community does not support indexing
since it prefers to have its depreciation front-loaded, a method available
under existing law. 54 Another difficulty with indexing is that if the pres-
ent cost of capital is maintained, while at the same time a substantial tax
cut which favors the individual taxpayer is enacted, there is a real possi-
bility that in the long run the result will be a revenue loss. For this rea-
son, the Senate Finance Committee ("Finance Committee") shares the
Administration's concern over the House bill. Because the Finance
Committee favors improving the treatment of capital investment, 55 it is
more than likely that something close to the Administration's proposal
will be enacted in this area.
In summation, it appears that the President and his Administration
will continue to push strongly for tax reform, and thus, one way or an-
other, before the end of the year, there will be a fairly significant change
in the tax law. Whether it is a fundamental tax reform is open to debate,
deductions. Id. In justifying the need to replace these provisions, the Treasury
Department explained:
At the lower rates of inflation prevailing today, the ITC and ACRS
allow investment in depreciable assets to be recovered far more rapidly
than under a neutral system of income taxation. As a result, the tax
system favors industries that invest heavily in depreciable assets such as
equipment over others such as high technology industries, service in-
dustries, and the trade sector that invests more heavily in inventories.
Because the advantages of the ITC and ACRS are "front-loaded,"
these provisions are of relatively little value to new and rapidly growing
firms or to ailing industries, neither of which can fully utilize their bene-
fits. New firms are penalized and there are incentives for tax-motivated
mergers. The result is reduced competitiveness and less incentive for
innovation. The front-loading of tax benefits also leads to the prolifer-
ation of tax shelters, many of which are abusive and create severe ad-
ministrative burdens for the Internal Revenue Service.
To assure that capital consumption allowances will be more nearly
appropriate, regardless of the rate of inflation, the Treasury Depart-
ment proposes that the investment tax credit be repealed, that the basis
of depreciable assets be indexed for inflation, and that depreciation al-
lowances for tax purposes be set to approximate economic
depreciation.
Id. at xiii.
54. See, e.g., Hearings on President's Proposals, supra note 1, at 3399 (statement
of David M. Roderick, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, United States
Steel Corp.: elimination of ITC coupled with slower depreciation will lead to
less capital investment); id. at 3402 (statement of Charles W. Parry, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer, Aluminum Company of America: opposes repeal of
ITC and worries about tax system which removes critical incentives for capital
intensive industries); id. at 3406 (statement of Richard Briggs, Executive Vice
President, Association of American Railroads: proposal places unduly heavy
burden on capital-intensive industries; opposes repeal of ITC and ACRS). For a
discussion of the benefits of the existing capital recovery provisions enjoyed by
corporations, see supra note 53.
55. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1986) (committee believes
efficient capital cost recovery system is essential to maintain economic growth).
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but if what has been proposed comes to pass, it certainly will be a major
change in the way the tax system operates.
IV. POSTSCRIPT
On October 22, 1986, President Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (1986 Act) thereby enacting what has been hailed as the most
comprehensive tax legislation in over thirty years.5 6 The scope and sig-
nificance of the new law are evidenced by the redesignation of the 1954
Code as the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.57 The progression of the
legislation from the House Ways and Means Committee to the Senate
Finance Committee and ultimately through the Conference Committee,
resulted in numerous concessions and changes being made to the
House-passed version of H.R. 3838 (House bill). Some of the more im-
portant changes include: 1) imposition of a two-bracket tax rate sched-
ule for individuals; 2) repeal of the 60% deduction for net capital gain;
3) modifications to the personal exemption and standard deduction
amounts and 4) adjustments to the capital cost provisions. 58
A. Tax Rate Schedules
The changes in the tax rate schedules are some of the most funda-
mental reforms in the new legislation. With respect to individuals, the
1986 Act rejected the four-bracket system set forth in H.R. 3838 and
adopted instead the tax rate structure proposed under the Senate
amendment.5 9 Beginning in 1988,60 an individual's income will be sub-
56. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
57. Id. § 2. The 1986 Act contains approximately 1,850 separate amend-
ments to the Internal Revenue Code, an unprecedented number for a single tax
law. See id. § 1(b).
58. See id. §§ 101(a), 301(a), 103, 102(a), 211, 201(a). For a discussion of
the two-bracket tax rate, see infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the repeal of the net capital gain deduction, see infra notes 71-78
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the personal exemption and stan-
dard deduction, see infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the adjustments to capital cost provision, see infra notes 88-96 and accompa-
nying text.
59. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. I-1 to 11-5 (1986).
60. The Act sets forth a five-bracket transitional rate structure for 1987.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 10 1(a), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 12-15. The following rate schedule will apply for the 1987
taxable year:
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ject to one of two tax rates, 15% and 28%.61 The top rate of 28% will
apply to taxable income in excess of $29,750 for married individuals fil-
ingjointly; $23,900 for heads of households; $17,850 for single individ-
uals and $14,875 for married individuals filing separately. 6 2 Beginning
in 1989, the taxable income levels to which the 28% rate applies will be
adjusted for inflation. 63 Although the maximum tax rate for all individ-
ual taxpayers is 28%, taxpayers with higher incomes are subject to a rate
adjustment which will phase out the benefit of the lower 15% tax rate.64
Thus, a taxpayer with income above a specified level will in effect be
taxed at the 28% rate on all of his taxable income, rather than only on
that amount of taxable income which is above the "breakpoint." '65
With respect to the corporate tax rate schedules, the 1986 Act
adopts the provisions of H.R. 3838 and replaces the prior five-bracket
graduated rate structure with a three-bracket system. 66 As to the maxi-
Taxable Income Brackets
Married, Filing Heads of
Tax Rate Joint Returns Household Singles
11% 0-$3,000 0-$2,500 0-$1,800
15% 3,000-28,000 2,500-23,000 1,800-16,800
28% 28,000-45,000 23,000-38,000 16,800-27,000
35% 45,000-90,000 38,000-80,000 27,000-54,000
38.5% Above 90,000 Above 80,000 Above 54,000
Id.
61. Id. The two brackets and tax rates will begin at zero taxable income due
to the replacement of the ZBA with the standard deduction. See CONF. REP. No.
841, supra note 59, at 11-4. For a further discussion of the standard deduction,
see supra note 36 and infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
62. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 10 1(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 165.
63. Id. The 1986 Act directs the Secretary to prescribe tables which will
increase the minimum and maximum dollar amounts for each bracket by a yearly
cost-of-living adjustment. Id. The yearly cost-of-living adjustment is to be based
upon the average of the consumer price index as of the close of the twelve
month period ending August 31 of the calendar year. Id.
64. Id. Those higher-income taxpayers who are subject to this rate adjust-
ment will have their income tax liability increased by 5% of their taxable income
within specified ranges. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 59, at 11-4. The Confer-
ence Committee explained that the:
rate adjustment occurs between $71,900 and $149,250 of taxable in-
come for married individuals filing jointly; between $61,650 and
$123,790 of taxable income for heads of household; between $43,150
and $89,560 of taxable income for single individuals; and between
$35,950 and $113,300 of taxable income for married individuals filing
separately. These amounts will be adjusted for inflation beginning in
1989.
Id.
65. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 59, at 11-5.
66. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 601(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 165. The new corporate rates are to apply to
taxable years beginning on or afterjuly 1, 1987. Id. § 601(b).
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mum corporate rate, the 1986 Act reflects a compromise between the
House bill and the Senate amendment. The new law imposes a maxi-
mum corporate tax rate of 34%, thereby splitting the maximum rates set
forth in the House bill (36%) and the Senate amendment (33%).67 The
maximum 34% rate applies to taxable income in excess of $75,000.68
Taxable income between $50,000 and $75,000 is taxed at a 25% rate,
and a corporation's initial $50,000 of taxable income is subject to a tax
rate of 15%.69 The benefit of the lower rates is phased out for high
income corporate taxpayers by means of a rate adjustment similar to the
adjustment applied to high-income individuals. 70
B. Capital Gains
The most radical change in the 1986 Act from the House bill and
prior law is its treatment of capital gains. The new law eliminates the
60% deduction for individuals for net capital gains (i.e. the excess of net
long-term capital gain over net short-term capital lOSS). 7 1 However, the
statutory provisions for determining the character of gain as ordinary or
capital, and as long-term or short-term are "retained in the Code to fa-
cilitate reinstatement of a capital gains rate differential if there is a fu-
ture tax rate increase. '" 7 2 The 1986 Act retains the deduction for capital
losses to the full extent of capital gains. 73 In addition, the 1986 Act
allows individuals to apply capital losses against up to $3,000 of ordi-
nary income.7 4
Although H.R. 3838 had proposed reducing the capital gains de-
duction from 60% to 42%, 75 the House did not call for the complete
67. See CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 59, at 11-158 to 11-159.
68. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 601(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 165.
69. Id.
70. Id. The conference report explains that "[t]he phase-out of the benefit
of graduated rates occurs through the imposition of an additional five-percent
tax" on taxable income between $100,000 and $335,000. CONF. REP. No. 841,
supra note 59, at 11-159.
71. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 132-33. In addition, the new law provides that
corporate net capital gain will be taxed at regular corporate rates and is not
eligible for the lower alternative tax rate of 28% which existed under prior law.
Id. § 311.
72. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 59, at 11-106.
73. Id.
74. Id. As under prior law, unused capital losses may be carried forward.
Id.
75. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 196. Under prior law, an individ-
ual could deduct 60% of any net capital gain from gross income. Id. Since the
maximum individual income tax rate was 50%o, the deduction meant that net
capital gain was taxed at a maximum rate of 20% (the 50% maximum individual
tax rate times the 40% of net capital gain included in adjusted gross income).
Id. The House Ways and Means Committee felt that it was appropriate to main-
tain the maximum tax rate for net capital gains at approximately the same level.
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elimination of the deduction. 7 6 The Senate Finance Committee, how-
ever, viewed the deduction as an unwarranted preference in light of the
substantial overall rate reductions and determined that eliminating the
deduction was one of the few ways to broaden the tax base among high-
income taxpayers. 77 The Conference Committee agreed and adopted
the Senate amendment.
78
C. Personal Exemption and Standard Deduction
Another means of broadening the tax base among high-income tax-
payers was accomplished through manipulation of the personal exemp-
tion. 79 The new law increases the personal exemption amount for an
individual, an individual's spouse and each dependent to $2,000 begin-
ning in 1989.80 The benefit of the increased personal exemption, how-
ever, is phased out for taxpayers having taxable income exceeding
specified levels. 8 1 This phasing out of the increased personal exemp-
tion corresponds to the same taxable income levels at which the phase
out of the 15% tax rate begins. 8 2 Thus, the increased personal exemp-
Id. Because the House Bill provided for a reduction of the maximum individual
tax rate from 50% to 38%, the House Ways and Means Committee proposed to
limit the net capital gain deduction to 42%. Id. This would yield an effective
maximum tax rate of222.04% on net capital gains for an individual with a maxi-
mum tax rate of 38% on the 58% of net capital gains included in adjusted gross
income. Id.
76. Id. The House Ways and Means Committee explained that the deduc-
tion was warranted because the reduced rates on long-term capital gains of indi-
viduals alleviated "the impact of high individual tax rates on dispositions of
assets that have appreciated in value over time." Id. Therefore, the Committee
concluded that these reduced rates "contribute to the efficient allocation of capi-
tal by minimizing the possible 'lock-in' effect of higher regular rates, and may
also serve as an incentive to investment." Id.
77. See S. REP. No. 313, supra note 55, at 169-70. For a discussion of why
the elimination of the deduction is one of the few ways to broaden the tax base
among high income taxpayers, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
78. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 59, at 11-106.
79. For a discussion of why the personal exemption is of primary benefit to
taxpayers with high incomes, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
80. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 103(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 18-19. The $2,000 amount is to be adjusted for
inflation annually after 1989. Id. The new law follows the House bill and the
Senate amendment in repealing the additional exemption for an elderly or blind
individual and, instead, provides an additional standard deduction amount for
such individuals. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 59, at 11-9. For a discussion of
the additional standard deduction amount for elderly or blind individuals, see
infra note 86 and accompanying text.
81. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 102(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 15-18. The benefit of the personal exemption is
phased out by imposing an additional 5% tax on taxpayers having taxable in-
comes within certain ranges. Id.
82. See id. For a discussion of the phase out of the benefit of the 15% indi-
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tion amount achieves its avowed purpose of raising the tax threshold
and thereby eliminating the tax liability of the very lowest-income fami-
lies. 83 At the same time, the 1986 Act also precludes high-income tax-
payers from using the exemption to shelter income.
Additionally, the 1986 Act follows the House bill in replacing the
zero bracket amount with the previously utilized standard deduction.8 4
Beginning in 1988, the standard deduction amounts will be increased to
$5,000 for joint returns and surviving spouses; $4,400 for heads of
households; $3,000 for single individuals and $2,500 for married indi-
viduals filing separately. 85 In 1987, an additional standard deduction
amount will be allowed for elderly individuals.8 6 Beginning in 1989,
these increased standard deduction amounts will be adjusted for
inflation.8 7
D. Capital Cost Provisions
In the area of capital investment, the Conference Committee was
confronted with a House bill and a Senate amendment which substan-
tially agreed on some provisions, but which differed markedly on others.
For instance, both the House bill and the Senate amendment called for
the repeal of the regular ITC.88 In accord with this bicameral agree-
ment, the 1986 Act repeals the ITC, subject to certain exceptions, for
property placed in service after December 31, 1985.89
In contrast, the House and Senate provisions dealing with acceler-
ated depreciation forced the Conference Committee to reconcile con-
flicting congressional views. In this area, the new law does not adopt the
Incentive Depreciation System set forth in the House bill, but instead
severely modifies the existing ACRS rules. 90 Under the 1986 Act, resi-
83. For a discussion of how the personal exemption increases the tax
threshold and eliminates the tax liability of low-income families, see supra notes
36, 37, 50 & 51 and accompanying text.
84. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 102(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 15-18. For a discussion of why the House Ways
and Means Committee favored reinstituting the standard deduction, see supra
note 36. The standard deduction was replaced by ZBA in 1977. See Tax Reduc-
tion and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 102, 91 Stat. 126, 135-
36 (1977) (amended 1986).
85. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 102(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 15-18.
86. Id. An additional standard deduction amount of $600 is allowed for an
elderly or blind individual who is married or is a surviving spouse. Id. If the
elderly or blind individual is unmarried or is a head of household, an additional
standard deduction amount of $750 is allowed. Id.
87. Id.
88. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 59, at 11-51.
89. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 82-86. The exceptions are for transition prop-
erty, qualified progress expenditure for periods before January 1, 1986 and
qualified timber property. See id.
90. See id. § 201(a). The new law modifies ACRS by: 1) providing more
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dential real property is depreciated over 27.5 years, while non-residen-
tial real property is depreciated over 31.5 years. 9 ' Tangible personal
property is classified as three-year, five-year, seven-year, ten-year, fif-
teen-year or twenty-year property based upon the depreciable life of the
property. 92 The appropriate depreciation category for personal prop-
erty is based upon the mid-point life of the asset as determined by the
asset depreciation range system (ADR) that was in effect prior to the
adoption of ACRS.
93
accelerated depreciation for the revised three-year, five-year, and ten-year
classes; 2) reclassifying certain assets according to their present class life as de-
termined by the asset depreciation range system and 3) creating a 7-year class, a
20-year class, a 27.5-year class, and a 31.5-year class. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra
note 59, at 11-39.
In addition, the new law prescribes depreciation methods for each ACRS
class in lieu of providing statutory tables. Id. The Conference Report explains
that:
[t]he depreciation method applicable to property included in the three-
year, five-year, seven-year, and 10-year classes is the double declining
balance method, switching to the straight-line method at a time to max-
imize the depreciation allowance. For property in the 15-year and 20-
year class, the conference agreement applies the 150-percent declining
balance method switching to the straight-line method at a time to maxi-
mize the depreciation allowance. The cost of section 1250 real prop-
erty generally is recovered over 27.5 years for residential rental
property and 31.5 years for nonresidential property, using the straight-
line method.
Id.
91. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 201(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 37-41.
92. Id.
93. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 59, at 11-39. The Conference Report
describes the depreciation categories as follows:
Three-year class.-ADR midpoints of 4 years or less, except
automobiles and light trucks, and adding horses which are assigned to
the three-year class under present law.
Five-year class.-ADR midpoints of more than 4 years and less than 10
years, and adding automobiles, light trucks, qualified technological
equipment, computer-based telephone central office switching equip-
ment, research and experimentation property, and geothermal, ocean
thermal, solar, and wind energy properties, and biomass properties that
constitute qualifying small power production facilities (within the
meaning of section 3(17)(c) of the Federal Power Act).
Seven-year class.-ADR midpoints of 10 years and less than 16 years,
and adding single-purpose agricultural or horticultural structures and
property with no ADR midpoint that is not classified elsewhere.
10-year class.-ADR midpoints of 16 years and less than 20 years.
15-year class.-ADR midpoints of 20 years and less than 25 years, and
adding municipal wastewater treatment plants, and telephone distribu-
tion plant and comparable equipment used for the two-way exchange of
voice and data communications.
20-year class.-ADR midpoints of 25 years and more, other than sec-
tion 1250 real property with an ADR midpoint of 27.5 years and more,
and adding municipal sewers.
27.5-year class.-Residential rental property (including manufactured
25
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Another issue on which the House bill and Senate amendment were
in conflict was the indexing of the depreciation deduction for inflation.
On this issue, the House bill provided that for the second year an asset
had been in service and those years which followed, the depreciation
deductions would be increased by half the annual inflation rate in excess
of 5%.94 The Senate amendment proposed to retain the prior law
which did not provide for basis adjustments of depreciable property to
reflect inflation.9 5 The 1986 Act follows the Senate amendment and
retains the prior law.9 6
homes that are residential rental property and elevators and
escalators).
31.5-year class.-Nonresidential real property (section 1250 real prop-
erty that is not residential rental property and that either does not have
an ADR midpoint or whose ADR midpoint is 27.5 years or more, in-
cluding elevators and escalators).
Id. at 11-39 to 11-40.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 1, at 154. Under the House proposal,
an inflation adjustment would have been computed for a taxable year only if
inflation for that year exceeded 5%. Id. If the inflation rate for the year ex-
ceeded 5% as measured by reference to the Consumer Price Index, the inflation
adjustment would have been the sum of: 1) one plus 2) one-half of the inflation
rate in excess of 5%. Id. A taxpayer's indexed depreciation deduction would
have been computed by multiplying the normal depreciation deduction times
the inflation adjustment. Id. For a discussion of IDS, see supra note 52 and ac-
companying text.
95. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 55, at 97-106.
96. CONt. REP. No. 841, supra note 59, at 11-45.
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